The LIST
-
Access control vulnerabilities
-
Missing or incorrect access modifiers
-
Use of
tx.origin
for authentication -
Unrestricted
delegatecall
usage -
Unprotected
selfdestruct
calls -
Misconfigured RBAC
-
Publicly accessible critical functions
-
Default visibility functions
-
Incorrect constructor definitions
-
Improper use of
require
-
Lack of input validation
-
-
Arithmetic/numeric issues
-
Integer overflow/underflow
-
Division by zero
-
Floating point precision errors
-
Unbounded loops
-
Incorrect use of
SafeMath
-
Off-by-one errors
-
Incorrect type casting
-
Improper handling of decimals
-
Deprecated Solidity versions
-
Incorrect gas calculations
-
-
Reentrancy/call issues
-
Classic reentrancy attacks
-
Cross-function reentrancy
-
Reentrancy via
fallback
/receive
-
Reentrancy in loops
-
Unprotected external calls
-
Use of
call.value()
-
Delegatecall to untrusted contracts
-
Unrestricted
call
usage -
Lack of checks-effects-interactions
-
Recursive call stack overflow
-
-
Denial of service issues
-
Gas limit and loops
-
Block gas limit reached
-
Unbounded arrays
-
External contract failures
-
Self-destruct in loops
-
Unprotected
assert
-
Unexpected revert DoS
-
Block timestamp manipulation
-
Block number manipulation
-
Storage exhaustion
-
-
Front-running/transaction ordering
-
Front-running attacks
-
Time dependency
-
Block hash dependency
-
Miner extractable value (MEV)
-
Lack of commit-reveal
-
Predictable contract addresses
-
Public function calls
-
Lack of nonce usage
-
Gas price manipulation
-
Inadequate randomness
-
-
Signature/authentication issues
-
Signature replay attacks
-
Incorrect signature verification
-
Malleable signatures
-
Missing signature expiry
-
Improper
msg.sender
checks -
Use of
tx.origin
for auth -
Missing nonce in messages
-
Weak hash functions
-
Insecure off-chain signatures
-
Lack of domain separation
-
-
Storage/memory issues
-
Uninitialized storage pointers
-
Storage collision in proxies
-
Incorrect storage slot calculation
-
Unbounded storage growth
-
Improper
delete
usage -
Variable shadowing
-
Incorrect memory allocation
-
selfdestruct
affecting storage -
Storage layout changes in upgrades
-
Improper handling of mappings
-
-
Upgradeability/proxy pattern issues
-
Unprotected upgrade functions
-
Incorrect implementation address
-
Storage misalignment
-
Delegatecall to malicious contracts
-
Lack of upgrade auth checks
-
Improper initialization
-
Multiple inheritance conflicts
-
Upgrade loops
-
Missing upgrade events
-
Upgrade incompatibility
-
-
Economic/financial vulnerabilities
-
Flash loan attacks
-
Oracle manipulation
-
Price manipulation
-
Pump and dump schemes
-
Rug pulls
-
Ponzi schemes
-
Improper fee calculations
-
Inadequate collateralization
-
Interest rate manipulation
-
Token inflation bugs
-
-
Miscellaneous vulnerabilities
-
Short address attack
-
Fallback function misuse
-
Incorrect event emissions
-
Timestamp dependency
-
Block number dependency
-
Gas limit assumptions
-
Unrestricted Ether reception
-
Lack of emergency stop
-
Inadequate testing
-
Poor documentation
-
Count of Vulnerabilities Where ABI Exploitation Is Involved
-
Access control (10 of 10)
-
All access control flaws
-
-
Arithmetic/numeric (4 of 10)
-
Certain overflow, underflow, unbounded loops, off-by-one exploits
-
-
Reentrancy/call (10 of 10)
-
All reentrancy-related vulnerabilities
-
-
DoS (5 of 10)
-
Unbounded arrays, external failures, revert-based DoS, storage exhaustion, unexpected revert
-
-
Front-running/MEV (3 of 10)
-
Front-running, commit-reveal absence, gas price manipulation
-
-
Signature/auth (6 of 10)
-
Signature replay, incorrect verification, malleable sigs, missing expiry, missing nonce, domain separation
-
-
Storage/memory (5 of 10)
-
Storage collisions, slot issues, uninitialized pointers, storage growth, mapping mishandling
-
-
Upgradeability/proxy (8 of 10)
-
Unprotected upgrades, wrong implementation address, lack of checks, improper init, event issues, upgrade loops, storage misalignment, delegatecall abuse
-
-
Economic/financial (5 of 10)
-
Flash loan, oracle manipulation, price manipulation, token inflation, improper fees
-
-
Miscellaneous (4 of 10)
-
Fallback misuse, short address attack, unrestricted Ether reception, inadequate testing
-
Types of Servers and Systems Storing/Monitoring ABI
-
Frontend web servers
-
Serve ABI in JavaScript bundles
-
-
Backend/API servers
-
Use ABI to encode/decode tx data
-
-
DevOps/CI-CD systems
-
Store and version ABI build artifacts
-
-
IPFS/Arweave decentralized storage
-
Host ABI + UI off-chain
-
-
Cloud function hosts
-
Use ABI to trigger blockchain actions
-
-
Blockchain indexers
-
Parse logs/events with ABI
-
-
Monitoring/tracing servers
-
Simulate and trace txs using ABI
-
-
Security engines
-
Scan contracts for unsafe functions
-
-
Transaction relayers
-
Relay calls using ABI definitions
-
-
Custom ABI gateway servers
-
Serve ABI on-demand via API
-
Issues to Consider in Bitlayer’s LVM + ABI Context
-
ABI remains critical for EVM-compatible LVM
-
Bitcoin multisig vaults don’t use ABI
-
Bridged token contracts on Bitlayer do need ABI
-
Contract upgrades change ABI
-
Multisig management requires correct ABI integration
-
Cross-chain bridging needs ABI standardization
-
Need for dynamic ABI updates
Best Practices for ABI Management in Bitlayer Ecosystem
-
Maintain updated ABI files
-
Use version control
-
Automate ABI retrieval
-
Securely store ABI files
-
Test ABI interactions thoroughly
Most Common ABI Management and Retrieval Systems
-
Version-controlled build artifacts
-
Hardhat/Truffle/Foundry outputs
-
CI/CD pipelines pushing ABI files
-
Etherscan verification/API retrieval
-
Central ABI service/microservice
-
Frontend bundling with updated ABIs
Minimal and Secure Proxy Contract Patterns
-
EIP-1167 minimal proxy
-
Transparent proxy pattern
-
UUPS proxy pattern
-
Use of separate ProxyAdmin contract
-
Strict upgrade access control
-
Avoid inline upgrade logic in proxy
Can ChatGPT Find Smart Contract Vulnerabilities?……yes.
ABI Management Architecture
1️⃣ Development & Version Control Layer
- Developers write smart contracts in Solidity and compile them using tools like Hardhat or Foundry.
- Compilers generate ABI JSON files into local
artifacts/
directories. - ABI files are committed into Git repositories alongside source code for version control and collaborative development.
2️⃣ CI/CD & Build Layer
- Continuous integration pipelines pull the latest ABI files and run tests to ensure consistency between contracts and frontend/backend code.
- During build, ABIs are optionally minified, obfuscated, or transformed into typed bindings (e.g., TypeScript interfaces).
- Build artifacts (including ABI) are bundled with the frontend or stored in a cloud artifact repository (e.g., AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage).
3️⃣ Deployment & Serving Layer
- Frontend apps (React, Vue, etc.) typically include ABI JSON as local assets or fetch from a backend API endpoint.
- Backend services might also store ABI in memory or retrieve them on-demand from verified sources (like Etherscan APIs) when interacting with contracts programmatically.
- Some projects deploy a dedicated ABI API Gateway service that responds to client requests with the appropriate ABI version, implementing authentication and rate limiting.
4️⃣ Runtime Interaction Layer
- Frontends use libraries like
ethers.js
orweb3.js
with ABI definitions to encode function calls, decode responses, and build event listeners. - Backend services do the same for tasks like monitoring contracts, automating interactions, or relaying transactions.
Internet & Data Security for ABI Code
✅ Common Security Measures:
- API Access Control: ABI-serving endpoints use API keys, OAuth, or other authentication methods to control access.
- Transport Security: ABI files (and any interaction data) are served over HTTPS with TLS encryption to prevent interception.
- Integrity Verification: Using checksums or digital signatures to ensure ABI files haven’t been tampered with.
- Obfuscation & Minimization: Optional technique to make ABI JSON less human-readable in production to deter casual scraping.
- Access Logging & Rate Limiting: Preventing abuse and tracing potential malicious activity when ABIs are served dynamically.
⚠️ Security Considerations:
- ABI is generally not considered secret data (because contract bytecode and function selectors are publicly visible on-chain).
- The real security focus is on ensuring that malicious actors can’t trick users into using fake ABIs (spoofing attacks) or inject modified ABIs into frontends.
- Protect sensitive functions (e.g., admin/upgrade) in the contract itself via robust on-chain access control mechanisms, since ABI exposure alone doesn’t cause security holes.
️ Recommended Security Practices
- Sign or checksum ABI files in CI/CD pipelines.
- Serve ABI via trusted and authenticated endpoints.
- Use secure source maps / source verification tools to ensure ABI matches deployed contract bytecode (e.g., Etherscan verification).
- Build rigorous frontend checks that confirm contract addresses and ABIs match expected deployments (avoid connecting to malicious contracts with seemingly identical ABIs).